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One view in the literature (Popov 2020) is that East Asian model is superior to other models in 
the Global South, at least in terms of catch-up development and possibly even in innovations beyond 
the technological frontier. Unlike economic models in Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa, the East 
Asian model prioritizes community interests (e.g., that of work collective, neighbourhood, nation-
state, and all of humanity) over those of individuals with the possibility of limiting some human rights 
for the greater benefit of all.  
Crucial features of the East Asian economic model include relatively low income and wealth 
inequalities, strong state institutional capacity (as measured by the murder rate and share of the shadow 
economy). The origins of the East Asian economic model can be traced to different trajectories of the 
development of the Global South since the 16th century (Popov, 2009; 2014).  
This paper argues that European economic model and East Asian model have a lot in common. 
After controling for the size of the country and the level of development, it turns out that government 
consumption as a share of GDP is relatively high in both models, whereas income inequalities are 
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Two basic economic models prevail in the Global South: one is the replication of the Western liberal 
model (e.g., in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and some former Soviet republics), and the other 
is sometimes referred to as an ‘Asian values’ model. These ‘Asian values’ are understood as the 
prioritisation of community interests (e.g.,  work collective, neighbourhood, national state, and all of 
humanity) over those of individuals with the possibility to limit some human rights for the greater 
benefit of all. Whereas the Western liberal tradition considers at least some human rights unalienable, 
in more traditional societies – not only in Asia but also in other parts of the Global South – collectivist 
solidarity is more entrenched. The core feature of the latter is the statistically measurable indicators of 
low income and wealth inequalities that helps to promote greater social cohesion and stronger 
institutional capacity of the state.  
 
It is argued that these features of the Asian model allow to maintain relatively strong and efficient 
governments and to promote successful catch-up development (Popov, 2009; 2014).  This collectivist 
economic model is found primarily in East  Asian countries, but also, to an extent, in the South Asia 
and Middle East and North African countries.  The European economic model, even though it was 
very different several centuries ago, when it emerged, today is very similar – relatively low 




Income and wealth inequalities in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are lower than 
in Latin America (LA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Gini coefficients of income distribution in East 
Asian countries are usually below 40%, similar to Europe, and the share of the top 10% income group 
in total income1 is lower than in the US and many developing countries (India, Russia, South Africa) 
– fig. 1.  
                                                          
1 This statistic comes from the tax data, not from household surveys that are normally used to study income distribution. 




In China, the Gini coefficient of income distribution is above 40% (even close to 50% according to 
the new unified survey for rural and urban regions – fig. 2) , but the country is so large that it should 
be compared with all Europe or at least with the US2.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Share of top income group in total income in selected countries, %  
 
Source: World Inequality Database. 
 
 
Accounting separately for within- and between-country/province inequalities produces very telling 
results. In China (29 provinces), the general Gini coefficient of income inequality in the early 2000s 
was over 40% with 24 p.p. attributable to between-province disparities. In the US, the Gini coefficient 
                                                          
advantage is that it takes better account of the very rich and very poor groups (that are usually not covered by household 
surveys).  
2 Three Chinese provinces (Guangdong, Shandong, and Henan) have populations exceeding 95 million. Another several 
provinces have populations of more than 50 million (i.e., larger than most states). Therefore, China should be compared 
with multistate regions (e.g., the EU or ASEAN) rather than with particular states. 
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was similar (over 40%), but only 6 p.p. came from disparities in income between the states. In the EU 
27 the Gini coefficient around 2005 was roughly 40% with 23 p.p. coming from between-country 
inequality. If China can manage to reduce the income gap between its provinces to a level close to the 
disparities between US states, then general inequality between citizens will fall to quite a low level 
(Milanovic, 2012), lower than in large European countries.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Gini coefficient of income distribution in China in 2003-19, %, new official sample  
 






And the wealth inequalities (“accumulated income inequalities”) in China appear to be much lower 
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the Forbes list to national income – in 2016 in China was only 6%, whereas in USA, Germany, France 




Fig. 3. Billionaire wealth from Forbes list as a % of national income in 1990-2016 in major 
countries 
 




Institutional capacity  
 
Lower income and wealth inequalities make societies less polarised and are usually associated with a 
stronger institutional capacity of the state. The institutional capacity of the state, according to a narrow 
definition, refers to the government’s ability to enforce laws and regulations. While there are many 
6 
 
subjective indices that are supposed to measure state institutional capacity (e.g., control over 
corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness indices), they may be biased and different from the 
objective indicators (Popov, 2011b).  
 
Natural objective measures of state institutional capacity are the murder rate (i.e., non-compliance 
with the state’s monopoly on violence3) and the shadow economy (i.e., non-compliance with 
government economic regulations, such as tax payment rules). East Asia and MENA countries are 
quite different from LA and SSA on both measures: East Asian countries have one of the lowest levels 
of both indicators in the developing world, comparable to that of developed countries (figs. 4, 5). 
 
In China, for instance, in recent decades there were only 1–2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants 
compared to 1–2 in Europe and Japan and 5 in the US. Only a few developing countries, mostly in the 
MENA region, had such low murder rates; these rates are typically higher by an order of magnitude 
in LA, SSA, and many former Soviet Union states.  
 
It is notable that murder rates in most countries are quite stable over time (fig. 6), but in China the 
murder rate fell since the 1990s by nearly 80% - from 2.3 in 1995 to 0.5 in 2018 per 100,000 inhabitants 
(fig. 7).  
 
The same pattern applies to the shadow economy: it constitutes less than 17% of Chinese GDP, lower 
than in Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. In developing countries, the proportion is typically around 40%, 
sometimes even greater than 60% (fig. 8). Only a few developing countries have such a low shadow-
economy share, in particular Vietnam and several MENA countries (e.g., Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 





                                                          
3 Crimes are registered differently in different countries; higher crime rates in developed countries seem to be the result 
of more accurate crime records. But grave crimes, such as murder, appear to be recorded quite accurately even in 




Fig. 4: Murder rates in countries with more than 15 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008 
 
Source: WHO.  
 
 




































































































Fig. 6. Average murder rates in 1960-2013 by decades, per 100,000 inhabitants, log scale 
(countries for which data are available for 3 and more decades) 
 
Source: Wikipedia.  List of countries by intentional homicide rate by decade 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate_by_decade). 
Data are taken from different sources (mostly national data provided to WHO) and sometimes are not 








Fig. 7. Murder rate in China per 100,0000 inhabitants 
 
Source: Wikipedia. List of countries by intentional homicide rate 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate);  List of countries by 




Fig. 8. Share of shadow economy in GDP in 2005 (%) and murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
in 2002 
 
Source: WHO; Schneider, 2007. Measures of the shadow economy are derived from divergence 






























































Needless to say that growth rates of productivity and per capita GDP depend on the institutional 
capacity  of the state (Popov, 2015)4, so countries with the strongest institutional capacity, ceteris 
paribus, have better chances to become growth miracles. So far only 5 countries/territories form the 
Global South – Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan – managed to join the rich country 
club due to their high economic growth rates.5 In recent decades Southeast Asia and China were 
catching up with the developed countries as well.6 
 
Inequality, state capacity, trust in the government and patriotism  
 
Low income inequality is generally tied to strong institutional capacity (e.g., low murder rate and low 
shadow economy), but to be more nuanced, it may make sense to distinguish between three groups of 
countries (Popov, 2020) - see fig. 9:  
                                                          
4 The cross-country regression equations of growth rates of GDP per capita in 1960-2013 on the objective indicators of the 
state institutional capacity (shadow economy and murder rate) are reported below (from Popov, 2015):  
 
y = -0.0003*** Ycap75 - 0.03*MURDERS –0.14***SHADOW + 5.32***    
  (- 4.95)      (1.67)               (-4.82)              (8.55) 
 
N=80, R2 = 0.38, robust standard errors, T-statistics in brackets below; 
  
y = 0.003***POPDENS – 0.0002*** Ycap75 - 0.023 MURDERS –0.067***SHADOW + 5.04*** 
 (4.08)           (-4.33)    (-1.62)            (-4.40)                   (7.67) 
 
N=80,  R2 = 0.40, robust standard errors, T-statistics in brackets below, where  
  
y –annual average growth rates of per capita GDP in 1960-2013, %,  
POPDENS – number of residents per 1 square km in 2000, 
Ycap75 – per capita PPP GDP in 1975 in dollars, 
MURDERS – number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002, 
SHADOW – share of shadow economy in GDP in 2005, %. 
 
Data on growth, population density and PPP GDP per capita are from WDI, data on murders are from WHO, data on 
shadow economy are from Schneider, 2007 (measures of the shadow economy are derived from divergence between output 
dynamics and electricity consumption, demand for real cash balances, etc.).  
 
5 Some developing countries became rich not due to rapid economic growth, but because of improved terms of their 
external trade – increased relative prices for their export goods. The best known example is oil exporting states of the 
Persian Gulf: with the exception of Oman, these countries did not enjoy high growth rates of physical output, but their per 
capita income approached the level of developed countries due to increase in oil prices since 1973.  
 
6 In 1920s–1970s, the USSR and East European countries were catching up with the developed countries, but later they 
slowed down considerably and, in the 1990s, experienced transformational recession.  In 1950–2020, high average 
growth rates (over 3% of per capita GDP annual growth) in developing world, in addition to East Asia, were observed in 
Botswana, Israel, and Oman. 
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Fig. 9. Gini coefficients of income distribution, murder rate, and shadow economy 
 
 
































































































































 low inequality and strong institutions (e.g., developed countries; some East Asian and MENA states);  
 relatively low inequality and poor institutions (e.g., former socialist countries and some MENA and 
East Asian states);  
 and high inequality and poor institutions (e.g., LA and SSA).  
 
Similar (but not identical) results can be observed by plotting several subjective measures of solidarity 
from the World Value Survey – trust in government and willingness to fight for one’s own country7 
(fig. 10) – against the murder rate, an objective indicator of institutional strength. Here we can 
distinguish between four groups of countries (fig. 11): 
 
 
Fig. 10: Trust-in-government index and patriotism index, log scale 
 
Source: World Value Survey.  
 
 
                                                          
7 The patriotism index and trust-in-government index are computed as the ratio of positive answers to negative answers 
in Round 6 (2010–14) of the World Value Survey.  
Question about patriotism (V66): Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, 
would you be willing to fight for your country?    
Question about trust in government (V115): How much confidence you have in the government (in your nation’s 






























Fig. 11: Patriotism index, trust in government, and murder rate 
 
 




 East Asian and MENA countries have generally low murder rates and higher patriotism and trust in 
the government; 
 developed countries have low murder rates and low trust and patriotism; 
 many LA and SSA countries have lower indicators of trust and patriotism and high murder rates; 
 many states of the former Soviet Union (e.g., Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) have high 
murder rates along with high trust in the government and patriotism. 
 
It can be hypothesised that higher trust in governmental institutions and stronger patriotism (i.e., 
willingness to fight for one’s own country) can build social cohesion and solidarity in difficult times, 
even if objective measures of institutional strength (e.g., murder rate and the shadow economy) are 
not that impressive. Conversely, strong institutions may not be enough to respond effectively to crises 
if social solidarity is weak. This trend may explain why, in advanced countries struck by the 
coronavirus, quarantine and isolation measures were less strict and enacted after a delay compared to 
East Asian and MENA countries, leading to much higher infection and death rates in the former 
(Popov, 2020).  
 
A related measure of social cohesion is the Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world (fig. 12) that 
is based on questions of the World Value Survey.   
 
Patriotism and trust in the government are regarded in this classification as the traditional values that 
“emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority, absolute standards 
and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, 
euthanasia and suicide. Societies that embrace these values have high levels of national pride and a 
nationalistic outlook”. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, “give high priority to 
subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life” (Inglehart, Welzel, 2013). 
 
Self-expression naturally becomes more important with economic progress – growth of per capita 
income, so that developed countries are more oriented towards self-expression and less to survival 
than developing countries. It is interesting though that on a secular- traditional scale (vertical axis of 
fig. 12) there are clearly two groups of developing countries – East Asia and former communist 
countries are quite “modern” and secular, whereas Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa are more 
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traditional (Middle East and North Africa and South Asia are in between). It could be hypothesized 
that East Asia and former communist countries maintain collectivist values and low inequalities in a 
“modern” rather than in a “traditional” way.  This modern way implies the greater reliance on the 
individual responsibility enforced by the power of the government (state capacity), not so much on 




Fig.  12.  Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world 
 






Inequality and government size 
 
The raw data on income inequalities and the share of government consumption8 in GDP (fig. 13)  show 
weak negative relationship – the higher the government consumption, the lower is the Gini coefficient 
of income inequalities.  This negative relation, however, is driven by the differences between rich and 
poor countries – with the growth of per capita income the share of government consumption increases, 
whereas the income inequalities decline.  As the per capita income increases, the government provides 
more and more public goods (health care, education, infrastructure) and expands social programs that 
mitigate income inequalities.  To eliminate this factor, one has to control for the level of development 
(per capita GDP).  
 
 
Fig. 13. Gini coefficient of income inequalities and the share of government consumption in GDP, 





                                                          
8 The comparable data on all countries are available only for the government consumption (final government purchases 
of goods and services).  Total government expenditure is equal to the sum of government consumption and government 
































































































5 15 25 35










Besides, larger countries generally have smaller governments as they can enjoy economies of scale 
(one currency, one border control and custom office, etc.) and they are less vulnerable to the shocks 
from the world market. Rodrik (1998) shows that more open economies have bigger governments and 
this holds for developed and developing countries. Small countries are naturally more open (higher 
share of external trade and capital flows in GDP), so other things being equal, smaller states have 
bigger governments. And, as was already mentioned, inequalities in larger countries are likely to be 
higher because of the uneven development of various regions of the large country. 
 
Regressions of Gini coefficients and government consumption on PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita 






Averages for the period 2016-19 (88 countries): 
 
GINIcoef  =   -0.00015*** GDPcap  +3.22*10e-13 * GDP + 39.7***  , robust 
(-3.9)                           (1.7)                 (32.0) 
Number of obs. =     88,    R-squared     =  0.1710, robust standard errors, T-statistics in brackets below; 
 
GOVcons  =   16.0  - 0.77**lnGDP  + 2.1***  lnGDPcap  ,      
             (1.5)      (-2.2)             (3.2) 
Number of obs. =     88,    R-squared     =  0.1311, robust standard errors, T-statistics in brackets below; 
where  
GINIcoef – average Gini coefficient of income distribution in 2016-19, %, 
GOVcons – average final general government consumption as a % of GDP, in 2016-19, %, 
GDP – average PPP GDP in 2016-19 in 2017 constant international dollars, 
GDPcap – average PPP GDP per capita in 2016-19 in 2017 constant international dollars. 
 
Averages for the period 2011-19 (144-217 countries): 
 
GINIcoef  =   -2.5*** lnGDPcap  +2.4*10e-13 * GDP + 60.8***  , robust 
      (-5.4)                      (1.8)                (14.2) 
Number of obs. =     144,    R-squared     =  0.1206, robust standard errors, T-statistics in brackets 
below; 
 
GOVcons  =   -0.75*** lnGDP  + 1.2***  lnGDPcap  +  24.7***,  
      (-2.9)      (3.1)            (2.6) 
 




GINIcoef – average Gini coefficient of income distribution in 2011-19, %, 
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GOVcons – average final general government consumption as a % of GDP, in 2011-19, %, 
GDP – average PPP GDP in 2011-19 in 2017 constant international dollars, 
GDPcap – average PPP GDP per capita in 2011-19 in 2017 constant international dollars. 
 
The residuals from these regressions show the deviation of the relative share of government 
consumption in GDP and Gini coefficients of income inequalities from the predicted levels (given the 
size of the country and the level of development). The simplified general picture is described by the 
scheme below (see Appendix). 
 
 
Scheme. Classification of economic models – deviation of income inequalities and the size of the 




SIZE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT 
                        
                                
                 LOW 
                     
 
      HIGH 
BIG  = Big government 
 = High state capacity   
 = Low inequality 
 
EAST ASIA, EUROPE 
= Big government 
= Low state capacity   
= High inequality 
 
LATIN AMERICA, SUB-
SAHARA AFRICA ( Argentina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Djibouti, 
Eswatini, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Togo, Zimbabwe), 
RUSSIA 
SMALL = Small government 
= Low state capacity 
 = Low inequality  
 
FORMER USSR and socialist countries 
(Albania, Kosovo, Lao PDR, North 
Macedonia, Mongolia, Vietnam,)  
+ South Asia and MENA ( Bangladesh, 
India, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Sudan, UAE) 
 = Small government 
 = Low state capacity   
 = High inequality 
 
LATIN AMERICA, SUB-




There are four group of countries (scheme):  
 
 with relatively low inequalities and big governments – East Asia and Europe;  
 with relatively high inequalities and small governments – Latin America and Sub-Sahara 
Africa, USA;  
 with relatively low inequalities and small governments (former USSR, South Asia and 
MENA); 
 with relatively high inequality and big government (LA, SSA, Russia). 
 
More detailed data are in the charts below and in the Appendix.  
 
For the period of 2016-19 relatively low income inequalities and high government consumption 
group includes European countries (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine); East Asia (China, Myanmar, Thailand). Besides, there are 
Bhutan, Liberia, Kyrgyz Republic, West Bank and Gaza that do not exactly fit into the primitive model 















Fig. 14. Excess government consumption as a % of GDP and deviation of Gini coefficient of 
income distribution, p.p. (2016-19 data)  
 




Relatively high income inequalities and low share of the government consumption in GDP in 
2016-19 are observed in Sub-Sahara Africa countries (Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Tanzania, Uganda); Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru) and the United States; and several “outsiders’ (Iran. 
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Fig. 15.  Countries with relatively high government consumption and low Gini coefficient of 
income distribution in 2016-19 
 
Source:  WDI (see Appendix). 
 
 
For the longer period (2011-19) there are more countries in the first group (low inequalities and high 
government consumption): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Italy and the UK in Europe (+ 
European offshoots – Australia and Canada); Japan in East Asia; and Algeria, Burkina Faso, Fiji, 
Guinea, Iraq, Timor-Leste, Tunisia elsewhere (fig. 16; Table 2 of the Appendix).  Whereas the second 
group (high inequalities and low government consumption) is being supplemented by SSA 
countries (Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, 
Ruanda, Zambia), LA countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay) 












































































Excess government consumption as a % of GDP, p. p. 
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Fig. 16.  Countries with high/low government consumption and low/high Gini coefficient of 
income distribution (2011-19 data)  
 
 

















































































Deviation of government consumprion as a % of GDP , p.p.
.
Deviation of government consumprion as a % of GDP and Gini 
coefficients of income distribution in 2011-19 from the predicted 

















































































Deviation of government consumprion as a % of GDP , p.p.
.
Deviation of government consumprion as a % of GDP and Gini 
coefficients of income distribution in 2011-19 from the predicted 





Thus East Asia and Europe in most cases appear to be in the same group of countries with relatively 
low inequalities and big governments with strong institutional capacity, whereas LA and SSA and 
USA are in the opposite group of countries with relatively high inequalities and small governments 
with weak institutional capacity. Trust of the public in the government institutions is usually high in 
developing countries of East Asia, but low to moderate in Europe and the US.  
 
If such commonalities between East Asia and Europe really exist, this could be a contribution to the 
Variety of Capitalism literature (Lee, 2020). The collectivist economic model based on low 
inequalities and big and efficient government appears to be most competitive in terms of catch up 
development and possibly in terms of innovative growth at the technological frontier and beyond. This 
low inequality-strong state model is found in developed world (Europe and Japan) and in developing 
countries (China, ASEAN). It is inherently consistent and has the potential to become the dominant 




The low inequality – big government model comes from two different historical trajectories.  The 
European model could be traced back to the 16th century, but emerged in its current form only in the 
20th century. Before the 16th century all countries had roughly the same per capita income, low savings 
rate and virtually zero growth rates. Only the destruction of the collectivist institutions (community) 
in the 16th century and beyond leading to the growth in inequality allowed the West to raise the savings 
and investment rates and capital/labor ratio. The result was the acceleration of growth rates of 
productivity and per capita income by the order of magnitude, but it came at a price: high inequality 
led to the weakening of the state institutions – in particular the murder rate was in double digits per 
100,000 of inhabitants in the 14th to 17th centuries, and life expectancy in the 16-17th century fell 
(Popov, 2009).  
 
This corruption of state institutions, however, was relatively short-lived: the murder rate in Western 
Europe fell to the current levels (single digits per 100,000 inhabitants) by the 18-19th century (Popov, 
2009; 2014). And in the 20th century, especially after the Second World War, income inequalities in 
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Western countries declined dramatically due to the proliferation of the big government, social and 
welfare programs – this was the response to the competition from the world socialism with free health 
care and education, strong social guarantees and low income inequalities (Popov, Jomo, 2015). 
 
In the Global South the collectivist model emerged in a different way. Since the 16th century the 
Western model of growth was adopted in many developing countries (through colonialism, like in 
Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa, or via voluntary Westernization in an attempt to catch up with 
the West, like in the Russian Empire). Such a proliferation of the Western model has resulted in the 
destruction of traditional institutions, increase in income inequality, and worsening of starting 
positions for catch-up development. This group of countries replicated the Western exit from the 
Malthusian trap – they experienced immediate increase in income differentiation, the rise in savings 
and investment rates and in the growth of productivity, but at a price of rising social inequality and 
deterioration of institutional capacities.  
 
Other developing countries (East Asia, and to an extent – South Asia, and Middle East and North 
Africa) were less affected by colonialism and managed to retain their traditional institutions. This 
delayed the transition to modern economic growth until mid-20th century, but allowed to preserve good 
starting position for economic growth – low inequality and strong institutions. Eventually slow 
technical progress allowed them to find another (and less painful) exit from the Malthusian trap—
increased income permitted to raise the share of investment in GDP without major increase in income 
inequality, without worsening of institutional capacity and decrease in life expectancy.  
 
This less Westernized region of the developing world became another reincarnation of the low 
inequalities – big government collectivist economic model. It turned into the fastest growing region 
of the developing world and started to catch up with the Western levels of per capita income due to its 
fast growth of productivity, not due to the favorable terms of trade shifts (like some oil exporting 
nations).  Japan, a developing country in 1950 (less than 18% of the US per capita income), slowed 
down since the 1990s, and Hong Kong slowed down since 2004, but other East Asian dragons – South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore– continued to grow at record rates bridging the gap with the US income 
27 
 
level. Singapore even surpassed the US levels of GDP per capita (fig. 17).  ASEAN countries and 
China are following suite.  
 
Fig. 17. PPP GDP per capita in some East Asian countries as a % of the US level 
 
 



































































































































































































































































The European collectivist economic model may be experiencing difficulties since the 1980s. Europe 
in 1923-33 and after the Second World War and until the 1980s was the fastest growing part of the 
developed world, growing faster than the US. Since the 1980s, though, growth rates of Western Europe 
have slowed down, and its relative per capita income stagnated at a level of about 70% of the US level 
(fig. 18).  
 
Fig.  18. PPP GDP per capita (in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) as a % of the US 
level  
 
Source: Maddison Project Database , 2018. 
 
 
One possible reason for these difficulties is the increase in inequalities taking place since the early 
1980s (fig. 19).  Even before the collapse of the Berlin wall, the USSR and East European countries 



































































































the need to contain the increase of inequalities to remain competitive vis-à-vis the world communism 



























































































































Source:  Clio-Infra database.  Https://clio-infra.eu/Indicators/IncomeInequality.html#.  Developed - 




As fig. 19 suggests, there was an increase in inequalities in recent decades in most countries, developed 
and developing. But developing countries as a group did not experience the reduction of inequalities 
in the 1930s-80s that was observed in developed countries.  Europe and East Asia are still the regions 
with lowest relative inequalities in the world, but this could change in the future, so the growth 
potential of the low inequality – big government – high state capacity collectivist economic model 
may be jeopardized.  Besides, it remains to be seen whether the collectivist model will be competitive 
at the technological frontier, if and when the productivity levels in these countries will become the 
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Gini coefficient of income distribution in developed and developing  









Table 1. General government final consumption (% of GDP), Gini coefficient of income 
distribution (%), PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita (constant 2017 international dollars), 






























values, p.p.  
Albania ALB 11.40 33.45 13287.90 3.81E+10 -3.97 -4.34 
Angola AGO 11.91 51.30 7120.93 2.16E+11 -2.98 12.55 
Argentina ARG 16.88 41.53 22902.49 1.01E+12 0.77 4.83 
Armenia ARM 12.43 33.50 12446.71 3.67E+10 -2.86 -4.41 
Austria AUT 19.48 30.25 54976.11 4.85E+11 0.89 -1.60 
Bangladesh BGD 6.13 32.40 4319.14 6.94E+11 -8.54 -6.91 
Belarus BLR 15.72 25.30 18534.42 1.76E+11 -0.05 -11.77 
Belgium BEL 23.08 27.50 50963.68 5.81E+11 4.79 -4.97 
Bhutan BTN 17.37 37.40 11274.55 8.46E+09 2.17 -0.68 
Bolivia BOL 17.54 43.60 8501.56 9.59E+10 2.55 5.09 
Brazil BRA 20.23 53.50 14553.53 3.04E+12 4.77 14.93 
Bulgaria BGR 16.12 40.50 21808.27 1.54E+11 0.10 3.91 
Canada CAN 20.98 33.30 48573.78 1.79E+12 2.88 0.09 
Chile CHL 14.25 44.40 23967.57 4.46E+11 -1.94 8.04 
China CHN 16.48 38.50 14797.97 2.06E+13 1.00 -5.68 
Colombia COL 15.06 50.30 14456.32 7.12E+11 -0.39 12.46 
Costa Rica CRI 17.17 48.33 19193.40 9.55E+10 1.35 11.39 
Croatia HRV 19.58 30.65 27105.96 1.12E+11 3.15 -5.15 
Cyprus CYP 15.35 32.15 38165.22 3.33E+10 -1.94 -2.01 
Czech 
Republic CZE 19.21 25.15 39267.91 4.17E+11 1.84 -8.97 
Denmark DNK 24.35 28.45 56026.73 3.24E+11 5.67 -3.20 
Djibouti DJI 21.58 41.60 5085.90 4.84E+09 6.86 2.62 
Dominican 
Republic DOM 10.79 43.87 17256.65 1.83E+11 -4.88 6.61 
Ecuador ECU 14.60 45.03 11526.65 1.95E+11 -0.63 6.93 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. EGY 9.38 31.50 11234.97 1.10E+12 -5.82 -6.93 
El Salvador SLV 16.08 38.87 8538.81 5.47E+10 1.09 0.38 
Estonia EST 19.88 30.80 34591.12 4.57E+10 2.86 -3.89 
Eswatini SWZ 23.35 54.60 8468.15 9.58E+09 8.36 16.11 
Finland FIN 23.09 27.25 47608.43 2.62E+11 5.06 -5.61 
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France FRA 23.44 31.75 45121.38 3.02E+12 5.61 -2.36 
Gabon GAB 12.36 38.00 15015.27 3.14E+10 -3.14 0.46 
Georgia GEO 13.84 36.97 13950.69 5.20E+10 -1.57 -0.73 
Germany DEU 20.05 31.90 53260.11 4.41E+12 1.58 -1.47 
Ghana GHA 9.16 43.50 5081.96 1.50E+11 -5.56 4.48 
Greece GRC 19.63 34.70 28928.52 3.11E+11 3.05 -0.90 
Honduras HND 13.67 51.23 5589.46 5.32E+10 -1.09 12.31 
Hungary HUN 19.86 30.45 30695.78 3.00E+11 3.15 -4.89 
Indonesia IDN 9.10 38.17 11162.69 2.97E+12 -6.10 -0.88 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. IRN 12.65 40.40 13650.54 1.11E+12 -2.74 2.32 
Ireland IRL 12.04 32.80 80353.68 3.90E+11 -8.52 4.68 
Israel ISR 22.57 39.00 39256.93 3.46E+11 5.20 4.90 
Italy ITA 18.87 35.55 41893.30 2.53E+12 1.29 1.13 
Kazakhstan KAZ 9.91 27.35 25242.39 4.59E+11 -6.38 -8.83 
Kosovo XKX 13.92 27.85 10743.37 1.92E+10 -1.24 -10.31 
Kyrgyz 
Republic KGZ 17.14 27.27 5086.33 3.19E+10 2.41 -11.72 
Latvia LVA 14.96 29.50 20741.35 7.61E+11 -0.98 -7.43 
Lesotho LSO 39.52 44.90 2769.69 5.82E+09 24.97 5.58 
Liberia LBR 17.11 35.30 1489.21 7.09E+09 2.66 -4.20 
Lithuania LTU 16.61 37.85 34635.10 9.77E+10 -0.41 3.15 
Luxembourg LUX 16.52 33.95 113741.90 6.84E+10 -6.62 10.80 
Malawi MWI 14.22 44.70 1041.10 1.87E+10 -0.20 5.13 
Maldives MDV 15.68 31.30 18492.32 9.35E+09 -0.08 -5.72 
Malta MLT 16.13 29.15 42798.56 2.05E+10 -1.52 -4.33 
Mauritius MUS 15.31 36.80 21785.12 2.76E+10 -0.71 0.25 
Mexico MEX 11.64 45.85 19817.30 2.49E+12 -4.23 8.22 
Moldova MDA 14.81 25.97 12004.10 3.27E+10 -0.45 -12.01 
Mongolia MNG 12.79 32.50 11621.14 3.65E+10 -2.45 -5.53 
Myanmar MMR 18.58 30.70 4848.54 2.60E+11 3.87 -8.39 
Netherlands NLD 24.47 28.35 55677.27 9.57E+11 5.82 -3.55 
Nigeria NGA 5.32 35.10 5191.46 1.00E+12 -9.42 -4.18 
Norway NOR 24.05 27.75 62979.21 3.33E+11 4.84 -2.89 
Panama PAN 11.50 49.83 30575.13 1.27E+11 -5.20 14.54 
Paraguay PRY 11.24 47.63 12571.93 8.69E+10 -4.07 9.72 
Peru PER 13.20 43.23 12635.12 4.01E+11 -2.11 5.23 
Poland POL 17.83 30.45 30982.46 1.18E+12 1.10 -5.13 
Portugal PRT 17.16 34.50 33487.80 3.45E+11 0.23 -0.44 
Romania ROU 16.24 35.20 27724.37 5.41E+11 -0.24 -0.65 
Russian 
Federation RUS 16.11 35.85 26207.44 6.16E+11 -0.26 -0.25 
Rwanda RWA 15.15 43.70 2060.35 2.51E+10 0.66 4.28 
Serbia SRB 16.33 37.50 17078.44 1.20E+11 0.67 0.24 
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Sierra Leone SLE 10.12 35.70 1658.68 1.26E+10 -4.35 -3.78 
Slovak 
Republic SVK 19.05 25.20 31429.72 1.71E+11 2.28 -9.99 
Slovenia SVN 18.53 24.50 37228.00 7.72E+10 1.31 -9.81 
Spain ESP 18.80 35.25 39840.08 1.86E+12 1.38 0.74 
Sri Lanka LKA 8.89 39.80 12703.57 2.74E+11 -6.43 1.85 
Sweden SWE 26.08 29.20 52810.36 5.34E+11 7.65 -2.99 
Switzerland CHE 11.94 32.85 67704.23 5.74E+11 -7.64 2.82 
Tanzania TZA 8.78 40.50 2555.60 1.38E+11 -5.75 1.11 
Thailand THA 16.36 36.60 17691.21 1.23E+12 0.65 -0.93 
Turkey TUR 14.83 41.73 27926.82 2.28E+12 -1.67 5.35 
Uganda UGA 8.21 42.80 2114.92 8.88E+10 -6.28 3.36 
Ukraine UKR 19.99 25.70 12138.51 5.14E+11 4.71 -12.41 
United 
Kingdom GBR 18.78 34.80 46044.63 3.05E+12 0.87 0.82 
United 
States USA 14.07 41.10 60783.55 1.98E+13 -4.97 3.87 
Uruguay URY 14.67 39.63 21334.73 7.35E+10 -1.31 3.00 
Vietnam VNM 6.49 35.50 7387.80 7.03E+11 -8.42 -3.37 
West Bank 
and Gaza PSE 21.61 33.70 6344.71 2.87E+10 6.79 -5.10 
 
Note:  Excess government consumption is computed as a residual from regression of general final 
government consumption as a % of GDP on PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita.  Deviation of Gini 
coefficient from predicted values is computed as a residual from regression of actual Gini coefficient 
on PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita.  
Figures in green are for countries with positive excess government consumption and negative 
deviation of Gini coefficients from predicted values. Figures in red are for countries with negative 
excess government consumption and positive deviation of Gini coefficients from predicted values.  
 
 





Table 2. General government final consumption (% of GDP), Gini coefficient of income 
distribution (%), PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita (constant 2017 international dollars), 
average for 2011-19  
 

































































Algeria DZA 19.5 27.6 11506.3 
458.1 
3.6 -10.3 
Australia AUS 18.3 34.4 48039.4 
1147 
1.3 -0.1 
Austria AUT 19.7 30.5 54044.5 
467 
1.9 -3.6 




Herzegovina BIH 21.6 33.0 12817.4 
44.12 
3.8 -4.5 
Burkina Faso BFA 16.1 35.3 1961.3 
35.76 
0.5 -6.9 
Canada CAN 20.9 33.6 47695.2 
1710 
4.3 -1.1 
China CHN 16.1 40.1 12781.7 
17570 
2.9 -1.6 
Croatia HRV 20.2 31.6 25343.6 
106 
2.2 -4.2 
Czech Republic CZE 19.3 25.9 36626.3 
387 
1.9 -9.1 
Denmark DNK 25.3 28.2 53754.0 
306 
7.2 -5.9 
Estonia EST 19.4 32.8 31933.7 
42.15 
0.5 -2.5 
Fiji FJI 19.0 36.7 12393.8 
10.82 
0.2 -0.9 
Finland FIN 23.7 27.2 46454.4 
254.1 
5.6 -7.2 
France FRA 23.7 32.5 44039.2 
2924 
7.6 -2.7 
Germany DEU 19.7 31.3 51743.5 
4228 
3.7 -3.8 
Greece GRC 20.3 35.5 28673.0 
311.6 
3.0 -0.1 
Guinea GIN 16.5 33.7 2205.4 
25.54 
0.5 -8.2 





Iceland ISL 23.9 26.7 52065.3 
17.48 
3.7 -7.3 
Iraq IRQ 20.7 29.5 10586.6 
374.7 
4.8 -8.6 
Italy ITA 19.3 35.2 41487.1 
2501 
3.1 0.0 




Republic KGZ 17.8 27.7 4788.7 
28.66 
1.0 -12.3 
Liberia LBR 16.9 34.3 1540.0 
6.882 
0.3 -8.5 
Myanmar MMR 17.8 34.4 4245.2 
223.9 
2.7 -5.9 
Netherlands NLD 25.1 28.1 53910.5 
915.5 
7.9 -6.0 
Norway NOR 22.7 26.7 61882.4 
320.2 
4.4 -7.0 
Poland POL 18.0 32.1 28348.1 
1077 
1.7 -3.7 
Slovak Republic SVK 18.6 26.4 29425.9 
159.7 
0.8 -9.1 
Slovenia SVN 19.2 25.3 34998.8 
72.31 
0.5 -9.8 
Sweden SWE 25.9 28.6 51209.4 
504 
8.2 -5.6 
Timor-Leste TLS 63.8 28.7 3228.6 
3.876 
  -12.2 
Tunisia TUN 19.4 32.8 10435.0 
116.9 
2.7 -5.3 
Ukraine UKR 19.1 25.1 12194.1 




Kingdom GBR 19.6 33.5 44633.9 
2907 
3.4 -1.7 
West Bank and 
Gaza PSE 23.7 34.1 6142.4 
26.29 
6.4 -5.3 
        
 
Most of the countries are from Europe (not highlighted). Asian countries are highlighted in red, MENA 














































Angola AGO 51.3 15.5 
212.0 
7623.6 -0.4 12.4 
Benin BEN 45.6 10.7 
31.6 
2968.9 -5.5 4.5 
Bhutan BTN 38.1 18.1 
7.4 
10194.5 -0.7 0.0 
Bolivia BOL 45.7 15.9 
86.1 
7899.1 -0.7 7.0 
Bulgaria BGR 37.7 16.3 
               
143.1 
19991.8 -1.2 1.2 
Cabo Verde CPV 42.4 17.9 
3.4 
6528.2 -1.0 3.2 
Cameroon CMR 46.6 11.8 
79.9 
3412.9 -3.9 5.8 
Chad TCD 43.3 5.4 
24.1 
1711.1 -10.4 0.8 
Chile CHL 45.2 13.2 
421.6 
23358.4 -3.6 9.0 
Colombia COL 51.7 14.5 
665.1 
13907.5 -1.3 14.2 
Comoros COM 45.3 10.3 
2.3 
2997.7 -7.9 4.2 
Congo, Rep. COG 48.9 16.2 
23.3 
4821.2 -0.8 9.0 
Costa Rica CRI 48.6 17.3 
87.9 
18105.7 -0.4 11.9 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 41.5 10.8 
102.6 
4367.2 -5.0 1.3 
Dominican 
Republic DOM 45.3 10.4 
159.1 
15422.3 -6.6 8.2 
Ecuador ECU 45.6 14.1 
188.5 
11590.6 -2.4 7.8 
El Salvador SLV 40.8 16.1 
51.7 
8167.9 -1.0 2.1 
Gabon GAB 38.0 13.4 
29.4 
15146.3 -4.9 0.9 
Georgia GEO 37.8 13.9 
47.3 
12693.3 -3.8 0.2 
Ghana GHA 43.0 10.4 
133.5 
4768.1 -5.3 3.0 
Guatemala GTM 48.3 10.8 
125.6 
8055.7 -5.6 9.6 
Honduras HND 52.3 14.8 
48.7 
5328.2 -1.8 12.6 
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Indonesia IDN 39.1 9.3 
2642.0 
10202.1 -5.1 0.4 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. IRN 39.3 11.3 
1046.0 
13308.5 -4.1 1.6 
Kenya KEN 40.8 13.6 
185.0 
3846.6 -1.6 0.3 
Lithuania LTU 36.2 17.0 
90.4 
31256.3 -1.4 0.9 
Luxembourg LUX 33.0 16.7 
63.1 
110645.4 -3.5 0.8 
Malawi MWI 44.7 14.2 
17.1 
1020.3 -1.2 0.9 
Malaysia MYS 42.1 12.8 
753.3 
24788.5 -3.6 6.0 
Mauritius MUS 37.7 14.7 
25.3 
20036.4 -4.1 1.2 
Mexico MEX 47.3 11.9 
2346.0 
19250.7 -3.4 10.2 
Nicaragua NIC 46.2 14.3 
34.1 
5464.0 -2.6 6.6 
Panama PAN 50.7 11.1 
112.2 
28126.1 -7.0 15.1 
Paraguay PRY 48.6 11.1 
79.1 
11792.7 -6.1 10.9 
Peru PER 43.7 12.3 
368.8 
12005.0 -3.8 5.9 
Philippines PHL 45.5 11.1 
758.3 
7398.3 -3.8 6.4 
Rwanda RWA 44.4 14.1 
21.6 
1877.6 -1.9 2.1 
Serbia SRB 39.2 17.3 
113.4 
16009.5 -0.1 2.2 
Sri Lanka LKA 39.5 8.5 
247.4 
11740.3 -7.8 1.7 
Turkey TUR 41.2 14.3 
2032.0 
25795.3 -1.4 4.9 
United States USA 40.9 14.7 
18720.0 
58402.9 -0.4 2.7 
Uruguay URY 40.2 14.0 
69.9 
20473.2 -4.0 3.8 
Zambia ZMB 57.1 13.8 
54.5 
3419.9 -2.2 16.3 
 
Note:  Excess government consumption is computed as a residual from regression of general final 
government consumption as a % of GDP on PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita.  Deviation of Gini 
coefficient from predicted values is computed as a residual from regression of actual Gini coefficient 
on PPP GDP and PPP GDP per capita. European countries highlighted in blue, Asia countries – in red; 
all other countries are either in SSA or Americas (LA and the USA). 
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